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We provide a unified approach to imperfect (monopolistic, Bertrand, and Cournot) competition
when preferences are symmetric over a finite but endogenous number of goods. Markups depend
on the Morishima elasticity of substitution and on the number of varieties. The comparative
statics of free-entry equilibria is examined, establishing the conditions for markup neutrality with
respect to income, market size, and productivity. We compare endogenous and optimal market
structures for several non-CES examples. With a generalized linear direct utility, the markup can
be constant and optimal under monopolistic competition, and nonmonotonic in the number of
firms under Bertrand or Cournot competition.
1. Introduction
 To understand how demand and supply fundamentals affect the structure of a market,
namely, how many firms are active in it, how much they produce, and at which markup they
sell, is a basic concern of economic theory. This important issue arises in the partial equilibrium
analysis of industrial organization, as well as in general equilibrium applications, for instance,
in international trade and macroeconomics.1 However, most of the modern theory of imperfect
competition in markets with product differentiation is based on a few, specific microfoundations
of the demand side. Models of monopolistic competition are usually based on CES preferences
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1 There is a wide empirical literature pointing out that markups are affected by the number of consumers, their
income, and productivity shocks. For recent examples, see Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) on competition effects
in industrial organization, Simonovska (2015) on pricing to market in trade, and Nekarda and Ramey (2013) on the
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or on separable direct utilities as in Dixit and Stiglitz (D-S, 1977) or on quasilinear preferences
as in Spence (1976), and more recently Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Anderson, Erkal,
and Piccinin (2012).2 As is well known, strategic interactions a` la Cournot or Bertrand add a
competitive element to the equilibrium of monopolistic competition, but also their analysis has
been usually limited to a few microfounded examples. Other cases analyzed in the literature
include those of homothetic preferences (Benassy, 1996; Feenstra, 2003 and 2014; D’Aspremont,
Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gerard-Varet, 2007) and of separable indirect utilities (Bertoletti and
Etro, 2014). Beyond these cases, little is known about how preferences shape competition and
the incentives to enter a market.
In this work, we provide a first step to characterize, under a general microfoundation,
the basic elements of an endogenous market structure: the number of active firms and the
quantity/price strategies adopted by them. We endogenize consumer behavior, entry choices, and
market strategies, but we take as a given the technological conditions and themode of competition,
which we assume to be either monopolistic competition a` la Chamberlin, Bertrand competition in
prices, or Cournot competition in quantities. Although this is typical of trade and macroeconomic
applications, we leave for future research the extension to additional interesting aspects of firm
behavior, such as the endogenous determination of technology throughResearch andDevelopment
(R&D) activity (Sutton, 1991) and of the mode of competition (see D’Aspremont, Dos Santos
Ferreira, and Gerard-Varet, 2007).
Our purpose is to analyze the three main forms of competition when consumers are endowed
with general (nonseparable) preferences that are symmetric3 over a large number of differentiated
goods, of which only some are endogenously provided.We start proposing a generalized definition
of monopolistic competition that applies to all cases with a large but finite number of goods.
Exploiting the properties of symmetric preferences, we show that the relevant demand elasticity
is provided by the so-called Morishima elasticity of substitution (as defined in Blackorby and
Russell, 1981),4 and can be computed directly from the utility function. We also show how the
markups relevant in Bertrand and Cournot symmetric equilibria depend on the same elasticity and
on the number of varieties actually provided. These results confirm that the difference between
the true demand elasticity and that perceived by firms under our definition of monopolistic
competition is indeed negligible when the number of goods is large enough.5 On this basis,
we characterize the implications of free entry and the comparative statics of the associated
endogenous market structure. To illustrate how to derive imperfect competition equilibria, we
reconsider a variety of preferences used in the literature on monopolistic competition, such as
additive preferences or examples of homothetic preferences.6 In addition, we provide the first
characterization of the equilibria under the so-called generalized linear direct utility proposed by
Diewert (1971), and under quadratic utilities that are neither homothetic nor additive.7 Following
Feenstra (2003), we account for changes in the functional form representing preferences due to
changes in the number of available goods.
2 The case of additively separable preferences has been recently reconsidered by Zhelobodko et al. (2012) and
Bertoletti and Epifani (2014). Many results are also known for quasilinear preferences with an outside good (Vives,
1999), but this assumption has the cost of eliminating any mechanism through which income directly affects demand.
3 In the economics of product differentiation, the assumption of symmetric preferences is the hallmark of the
“Chamberlinian paradigm,” as first formalized by D-S (1977).
4 Notice that in the general case of preferences defined over more than two goods, there are different ways of
defining the elasticity of substitution (see Blackorby and Russell, 1989).
5 This is known in models based on additive preferences: see, for instance, Yang and Heijdra (1993) and Bertoletti
and Epifani (2014). We show that it holds in all models with symmetric preferences.
6 In particular, we consider translog preferences and the so-called generalized Leontief preferences: these belong
to the so-called “quadratic mean of order r” (QMOR) expenditure functions recently reexamined by Feenstra (2014).
7 Although we are not aware of an earlier use of the quadratic indirect utility considered here, the quadratic direct
utility is derived by the quasilinear preferences of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), eliminating the outside good and has been
used elsewhere under monopolistic competition.
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Our investigation allows us to shed some light on a number of issues in the theory of
imperfect competition. For instance, in the analysis of monopolistic competition, we provide
a new example (under a generalized linear direct utility) of non-CES preferences that deliver
constant equilibriummarkups. This is indeed a case where theMorishima elasticity of substitution
is fixed under symmetric consumption. Moreover, we show that homothetic preferences generate
prices that could either decrease with more competitors, if their goods are perceived as becoming
more substitutable, or increase when they are perceived as becoming more differentiated, and
we have closed-form examples in both directions. In the analysis of strategic interactions, we
generalize two results already established in the literature for quasilinear, homothetic, and additive
preferences (see, respectively, Vives, 1999; D’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gerard-Varet,
2007; Bertoletti and Epifani, 2014): the Cournot markup is higher than the Bertrand markup and
both are higher than the monopolistic competition markup and converge to the latter when the
number of firms becomes infinite. Moreover, we present novel examples in which Cournot and
Bertrand markups initially decrease but subsequently increase in the number of firms.
A main contribution of our work is to characterize the comparative statics of markups under
endogenous market structures, which may have applications for the modern theories of trade and
macroeconomics featuring imperfect competition. In particular, we characterize the conditions
on preferences under which in a well-behaved unique free-entry equilibrium either neutrality
or competitive effects arise with respect to changes in three key parameters: (i) the number of
consumers, which represents market size in trade models or labor force in macroeconomics;
(ii) the individual income of consumers, whose changes correspond to cross-country income
differences in trade, and to demand shocks in macroeconomics; and (iii) the marginal cost, whose
reduction corresponds to globalization in trade and to a productivity boost in macroeconomics.
Results are simple under monopolistic competition. The neutrality of income on markups holds
under any additive direct utility and also with a quadratic indirect utility. The neutrality of
population on markups holds not only with CES preferences, but also under any additive indirect
utility, with all of its consequences in terms of pure gains from variety due to a larger market
size. The neutrality of productivity on markups always holds under homothetic preferences,
because only the number of firms affects them, so that changes in the marginal cost are translated
proportionally on prices (complete pass-through) and never affect the number of firms. Additional
competitive effects emerge in our analysis under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Investigating
which of these potential market effects actually arises is left as an important task for empirical
research.
Finally, we analyze the optimal allocations for general preferences and compare them with
the endogenous market structures. To exemplify our results, we discuss examples with or without
excess entry. Remarkably, under generalized linear preferences, we show that monopolistic com-
petition generates insufficient (excess) entry if and only if markups are increasing (decreasing)
in the number of firms, and efficiency when they are independent from the number of firms. This
shows for the first time that efficiency of monopolistic competition equilibria can occur beyond
the case of CES preferences.
The novelty of our contribution is to generalize results that have been (separately) established
only for three classes of preferences (homothetic and directly or indirectly additive). Therefore, it
is important to clarify which of our results are novel and their relation with the recent literature.
The characterization of Chamberlinian, Bertrand, and Cournot symmetric equilibria through
the simple derivation of the Morishima elasticity of substitution, which holds for all symmetric
preferences, is established here for the first time, as well as the general conditions for the neutrality
of income,market size, and productivity onmarkups.However, the neutrality of productivity under
homotheticity is a simple consequence of the dependence of markups on the number of goods
alone, known at least since Kimball (1995) and Benassy (1996), the neutrality of income under
direct additivity was noticed by Zhelobodko et al. (2012), and the neutrality of market size under
indirect additivity has been derived in Bertoletti and Etro (2016). We show that these neutralities
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can also emerge under more general conditions, and we provide new examples of preferences
delivering constant markup or just income neutrality under monopolistic competition.
An independent work by Parenti, Ushchev, and Thisse (2014) has also analyzedmonopolistic
competition under a general microfoundation with a continuum of goods. This work does not
analyze (given the continuum of goods) the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria and it does not
identify the role of the Morishima elasticity of substitution. Moreover, it does not address the
problem of dependence of symmetric preferences on the number of varieties not (yet) provided
by the market. However, Parenti, Ushchev, and Thisse (2014) confirm the three neutralities for
the main classes of preferences and independently derive rules for the optimal market structure.
Their analysis can be seen as complementary to ours from a methodological point of view
because it is done in the limit case of a continuum of goods. It is also useful because it allows for
extensions to an outside commodity, heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous firms, which
can be exploited for general equilibrium applications. Trade models of monopolistic competition
with a continuum of heterogeneous firms for homothetic and directly and indirectly additive
preferences are presented also in Feenstra (2014), Arkolakis et al. (2015), and Bertoletti, Etro,
and Simonovska (2016).
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the general model for a given number
of firms and Section 3 illustrates it in examples, Section 4 endogenizes the number of firms, and
Section 5 discusses optimality. Section 6 discusses informally additional applications of our
framework and concludes. Technical details are left to the Appendixes.
2. The model
 Consider a market populated by L identical consumers with income E > 0 to be spent on a
number of differentiated goods, each one produced by a firm with marginal cost c and fixed cost
F (if labor is used as the numeraire, c and F can be measured in terms of units of labor and E
interpreted as the individual labor endowment). The price for variety j is pj and its individual
consumption is given by x j .
We assume that the potential (arbitrarily large but finite) number of varieties, N , is given,
and that preferences over them are symmetric (on the properties of symmetric preferences, see
Appendix A). However, only a number n < N of varieties are actually consumed in the market,
and preferences can then be represented equivalently by symmetric direct or indirect utility
functions as:
Un = Un(x) or V n = V n(s), (1)
where si = pi/E , i = 1, . . . n are the normalized prices. To satisfy standard conditions, it is
assumed that, for any n, Un(·) is increasing and quasiconcave, that V n(·) is decreasing and
quasiconvex, and that both are (at least three times) differentiable. Notice that, as in Feenstra
(2003), utility functions (1) are naturally indexed by the number n, and are endogenously derived
from the underlying preferences (kept fixed), imposing that N − n varieties have a price so high
that their demands are nil (see Appendix B).
The inverse and direct (Marshallian) demand systems are immediately provided by the
following FOCs for utility maximization and the Roy identities8:
s(x) = DU
n(x)
μ˜n(x)
, x(s) = DV
n(s)
μn(s)
, (2)
where
μ˜n(x) =
n∑
j=1
Unj (x)x j , μ
n(s) =
n∑
j=1
V nj (s)s j , (3)
8 Throughout this article, we assume that x(s) as well as s(x) behave well, and in particular are unique. For the sake
of simplicity, we omit the index n.
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and suffixes denote partial derivatives. Notice that |μn(s)| = μ˜n(x(s)) is the relevant marginal
utility of income (multiplied by income E). It is now useful to state a fundamental property of
symmetric preferences (the proof is provided in Appendix A):
Lemma 1. Symmetry of preferences implies that:
Uni (x) = hn(xi , x) and V ni (s) = gn(si , s), (4)
where hn and gn are symmetric functions with respect to x and s, respectively, for given xi and si .
It follows that μ˜n and μn are symmetric functions, too, and that the inverse and direct
demand functions:
si (xi , x) = h
n(xi , x)
μ˜n(x)
, xi (si , s) = g
n(si , s)
μn(s)
, (5)
i = 1, . . . , n, are symmetric with respect to their second (vector) arguments.
The profits of firm i can be written as:
πi = (pi − c)xi L − F. (6)
The equilibrium market structure depends on the form of competition, and we will examine
separately three different forms. Monopolistic competition neglects strategic interactions and
is useful to analyze markets with many firms (especially in general equilibrium applications),
whereas Bertrand and Cournot competition take in consideration strategic interactions and are
suitable to analyze markets with a small (and possibly endogenous) number of firms. First, we
will focus on equilibrium pricing and production decisions for a given number of varieties/firms,
and then we will characterize the endogenous market structures determined by free entry.
 Monopolistic competition. Within a large market, each firm can reasonably hold the
belief that its actions will have no major effect on rivals. This core assumption of monopolistic
competition is obviously satisfied in models with a continuum of goods: in equilibrium firms,
which cannot influence their competitors’ profit, correctly anticipate the value of the market
variables and compute their demand elasticity. When the number of goods is finite but sufficiently
large and preferences are separable (namely, hn and/or gn depend only on the own choices), D-S
(1977) suggested to model monopolistic competition by neglecting strategic interactions although
still assuming that firms anticipate the value of the equilibrium demand shifter (namely, μ˜n and/or
μn). Intuitively, this is reasonable because the impact of individual choices on the shifter will
indeed be negligible if the number of firms is large. However, we need a definition of this market
structure which applies also to the case of general preferences. According to (5), the direct effect
of a firm choice on its demand is just captured by the partial derivatives of demand with respect
to its first argument:
hn1(xi , x) and g
n
1 (si , s),
whereas the indirect effect, analogous to the impact of a competitor’s choice, operates through
the symmetric component of demand. This suggests the following generalized definition of
monopolistic competition, which extends the D-S (1977) proposal9:
Definition 1. Monopolistic competition characterizes a market structure in which each firm sets
its choice ignoring its indirect impact on demand although correctly anticipating the value of the
market variables.
9 Notice that hn or gn might be independent, respectively, from xi and si (given, respectively, x and s). This is what
happens in the case of homogeneous goods, where hn(
∑n
j=1 x j ) depends only on the total quantity consumed, leading to
well-known results. Throughout this article, we assume on the contrary that hn and gn are monotonic with respect to their
first arguments.
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Notice that in many applications, this is equivalent to say that each firm takes as given the
value of some symmetric choice aggregators (and the number of competitors n). This happens not
only under direct additivity of preferences (D-S, 1977) or indirect additivity (Bertoletti and Etro,
2014), but also whenever it is possible to define appropriate “market indexes,” as with homothetic
preferences or in the aggregative games studied byAnderson, Erkal, andPiccinin (2012).However,
under nonseparable preferences, demands generally depend intrinsically on competitors’ choices,
and accordingly our definition extends the domain of application of monopolistic competition to
all symmetric settings.10 Obviously, to be acceptable as a behavioral assumption it requires that
the market is sufficiently large to make negligible the indirect effect discussed above.
As for monopolistic behavior, the profit maximizing choices are independent from the
strategic variable adopted (price or quantity). To verify that this is the case, notice that inverting
hn(xi , x) in (5) one obtains:
xi = (hn)−1 (si μ˜n(x(s)), x(s)) = xi (si , s),
that is, the partial inverse of hn with respect to its first argument gives the value of xi . This
implies that the perceived demand function under monopolistic competition does not depend on
the variable (price or quantity) chosen to express firm’s choice.
According to Definition 1, the perceived inverse demand elasticity and the perceived direct
demand elasticity in monopolistic competition are given by:
n(xi , x) = −h
n
1(xi , x)xi
hn(xi , x)
and εn(si , s) = − si g
n
1 (si , s)
gn(si , s)
, (7)
which are, of course, one the reciprocal of the other when evaluated at x(s). Standard conditions
for the maximization of profits (6) show that n(xi , x) and εn(si , s) determine the optimal pricing
rules under monopolistic competition:
pi − c
pi
= n(xi , x) = 1
εn(si , s)
.
Such a condition must hold also when firms have different marginal costs, say ci for firm i , as
often assumed in trade models since the work of Melitz (2003).11 However, in what follows, we
focus on the case of firms with identical cost functions looking for symmetric equilibria, for
which we simplify our notation to n(x) ≡ n(x, xι) and εn(s) ≡ εn(s, sι), where ι is the relevant
unit vector. This allows us to obtain immediately:
Proposition 1. In any symmetric equilibrium of monopolistic competition:
p−c
p
= n(x) = 1
εn(s)
. (8)
The explicit solution for the symmetric equilibrium price can be obtained using the budget
constraint nxs = 1. Notice that (p − c)/p is a continuous, increasing function from [c,∞)
onto [0, 1): thus, a monopolistic competition equilibrium exists if 0 < n(x) < 1 or εn(s) > 1
everywhere.12
 The role of the Morishima elasticity. The interpretation of the elasticities in (7) is not
immediate because we are departing from the common assumptions of separability. However,
10 This definition actually suggests a way of generalizing our approach to the case of asymmetric preferences: see
the cases of generalized additivity (Pollak, 1972) and implicit additivity (Hanoch, 1974).
11 Although in this article we deal only with the case of symmetric firms, the reader interested in applications to the
case of (a continuum of) heterogeneous firms can refer to Feenstra (2014), Parenti, Ushchev, and Thisse (2014), Arkolakis
et al. (2015), and Bertoletti, Etro, and Simonovska (2016).
12 Sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium are obviously ∂εn(s)/∂s ≥ 0 and ∂n(x)/∂x ≤ 0 for any
s and x .
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we can provide both a constructive approach to characterize equilibria and an interpretation of
our results by referring to the elasticity of substitution. The literature has developed alternative
generalizations of the substitutability measure introduced by John Hicks and Joan Robinson for
the case of two goods under homotheticity (see Hicks, 1970 and Blackorby and Russell, 1989).
Here, we apply to the demand systems (5) the so-calledMorishima Elasticity of Complementarity
(MEC), i j (x), and theMorishima Elasticity of Substitution (MES), εi j (s), as defined in Blackorby
and Russell (1981). These measures correspond to the elasticities of the price ratio si/s j with
respect to the quantity of good i , xi , and of the quantity ratio xi/x j with respect to the price of
good i , si (for i = j):
i j ≡ −∂(si/s j )
∂xi
xi
(si/s j )
and εi j ≡ −∂(xi/x j )
∂si
si
(xi/x j )
, (9)
and can be directly computed for any preferences in (1) by deriving the price ratio si/s j = Uni /Unj
and the quantity ratio xi/x j = V ni /V nj . To see their role in our setting, we need to rewrite the
perceived demand elasticity. By symmetry of preferences,whenever si = s j and xi = x j we have:
hn1(xi , x) = Unii (x) − Uni j (x) and gn1 (si , s) = V nii (s) − V ni j (s).
Using this, by direct computation we can express the perceived demand elasticities (7) as follows:
n = xiU
n
ji
Unj
− xiU
n
ii
Uni
= i j and εn =
si V nji
V nj
− si V
n
ii
V ni
= εi j , (10)
where we used symmetry again to replaceUni withU
n
j and V
n
i with V
n
j . Accordingly, the perceived
demand elasticity that is relevant for firms active under monopolistic competition corresponds to
the elasticity of the relative demand of two goods when their relative price changes (starting from
identical prices). Moreover, given any preferences (1), one can directly compute the monopolistic
competition equilibrium by calculating the MES or the MEC as shown above.
Of course, our result generalizes the role of the constant elasticity of substitution under
CES preferences in shaping monopolistic markups.13 It provides a rationale for the well-known
fact that, under direct additivity of preferences (D-S, 1977), the perceived demand elasticity
depends only on the individual consumption of each variety and, in particular, on the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption—what Zhelobodko et al. (2012) define as “relative love for
variety.” It also explains why under indirect additivity (Bertoletti and Etro, 2014) the perceived
demand elasticity of each firm depends only on its price-income ratio. In addition, the result
that with homothetic preferences the symmetric demand elasticity depends only on n (Kimball,
1995; Benassy, 1996) follows from the homogeneity properties of the previous elasticities under
homotheticity. Moreover, our formulas apply in the more general case of nonadditive and non-
homothetic preferences, opening up unexplored scenarios. This perspective also illuminates the
relationship between the elasticities perceived under monopolistic competition and the demand
elasticities relevant in case of strategic interactions, which are our next focus.
 Cournot competition. We nowmove to the case of Nash equilibria which arise when firms
compete by choosing how much to produce. Consider the following (standard) definition:
Definition 2. Cournot competition characterizes a market structure in which each firm sets its
production level taking in consideration its total impact on the inverse demand and taking as
given the production level of each other firm.
13 In this article, we refer to “markup” either as the ratio p/c or as the monotonically related expressions p/c − 1
and 1 − c/p (the latter is the so called “Lerner index”): obviously, they are determined by the relevant pricing rule based
on the (perceived) demand elasticity.
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The relevant Cournotian “individual marginal revenue” of firm i , MRi = ∂{pi xi}/∂xi , can
be written as:
MRi =
[
Uni (x) + Unii (x)xi
]
μn(x) + Uni (x)xi
[
Uni (x) +
∑n
j=1 U
n
ji (x)x j
]
−μ˜n(x)2/E
= pi (x)
{
1 − si (x)xi + U
n
ii (x)xi
Uni (x)
−
n∑
j=1
Unji (x)xi
Unj (x)
s j (x)x j
}
= pi (x)
{
1 − si (x)xi −
n∑
j =i
i j (x)s j (x)x j
}
= pi (x)
n∑
j =i
[
1 − i j (x)
]
s j (x)x j , (11)
where i j is again theMEC between varieties i and j and s j x j is the market share of firm j . Notice
that positive marginal revenues require that the elasticities of complementarity are “on average”
(with market shares as weights) smaller than 1. Equating the marginal revenue to the marginal
cost c, in a Cournot equilibrium we have:
pi (x) − c
pi (x)
= si (x)xi +
n∑
j =i
i j (x)s j (x)x j , (12)
which provides the general version of the Cournotian pricing rule.
Focusing on the case of a symmetric equilibrium, the markup becomes 1/n + (n −
1)n(x)/n, which exhibits a simple relationship with the pricing rule of the monopolistic com-
petition equilibrium. Using n(x) = 1/εn(s), we can express the same rule in terms of the MESs
drawn from the indirect utility.14 This proves the following result, where the superscript C refers
to Cournot:
Proposition 2. In any symmetric Cournot equilibrium:
pC − c
pC
= 1
n
+ n − 1
n
n(xC ) = 1
n
+ n − 1
nεn(sC )
. (13)
One implication of this result is that one can directly compute the symmetric Cournot
equilibrium for a given number of firms after deriving the appropriate Morishima elasticities from
the primitive preferences: in the next section, wewill provide similar computations for caseswhere
a direct derivation of the Cournot equilibrium would be intractable. To compare monopolistic and
Cournot competiton, notice that 1 > 1
n
+ n−1
n
n(x) > n(x) if n < 1.Accordingly, the assumption
n < 1 allows to conclude that the Cournot markup is always higher than the monopolistic
competition markup for given preferences, a result already known for a variety of examples (as
with quasilinear, separable, or homothetic preferences), but not in general. The ranking depends
on the fact that Cournotian firms internalize also the indirect impact of their production level on
marginal revenues, which is the same as the increase of production by any competitor: as goods
are substitutes in a symmetric equilibrium,15 this impact is negative and internalizing it amounts
to reduce production and increase markups.16
14 An alternative proof can be provided by obtaining the elasticity of the direct demand from the inversion of the
inverse demand system at its symmetric equilibrium.
15 When demand is elastic (and there is no outside commodity), a price increase must raise the expenditure in the
other commodities.
16 More formally, let us differentiate
∑n
j=1 s j (x)x j = 1 with respect to xi , making use of (5). In a symmetric
equilibrium, this gives 1 = −∑nk=1 ∂sk∂xi xs = n − n ∂s j∂xi xs (i = j). Then, n < 1 implies that ∂s j/∂xi < 0, that is, that
varieties are “gross, q-substitutes” (see Hicks, 1970, for this terminology) in a symmetric equilibrium. Accordingly,
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 Bertrand competition. Let us now consider the Nash equilibria in the case firms use price
strategies. We adopt the following (standard) definition:
Definition 3. Bertrand competition characterizes a market structure in which each firm sets its
price taking in consideration its total impact on the direct demand and taking as given the price
of each other firm.
Bertrand firms set their Lerner index as the inverse of the true elasticity of their Marshallian
direct demand (5). This is:∣∣∣∣ ∂ ln xi∂ ln pi
∣∣∣∣ = − sixi (s) V
n
ii (s)μ
n(s) − V ni (s)
[
V ni (s) +
∑n
j=1 V
n
ji (s)s j
]
[μn(s)]2
= − si V
n
ii (s)
V ni (s)
+ si
μn(s)
[
V ni (s) + V nii (s)si +
n∑
j =i
V nji (s)s j
]
= si xi (s) +
n∑
j =i
[
si V nji (s)
V nj (s)
− si V
n
ii (s)
V ni (s)
]
s j x j (s)
= 1 +
n∑
j =i
(
εi j (s) − 1
)
s j x j (s), (14)
which depends on the MESs with the other varieties. Note that, if si = s (and then xi = x),
i = 1, .., n: ∣∣∣∣ ∂ ln xi∂ ln pi
∣∣∣∣ = n − 1n εn + 1n ,
confirming the expected result for which the difference between the true demand elasticity and
that perceived by firms under monopolistic competition is negligible when n is large. Even when
the consumption pattern is not symmetric (e.g., because neither preferences are), by manipulating
the Slutsky equations one can easily prove that:∣∣∣∣ ∂ ln xi∂ ln pi
∣∣∣∣ = εi j − ∂ ln x˜ j∂ ln pi + si xi ∂ ln xi∂ ln E ,
where x˜ j is the compensated (Hicksian) demand for variety j . As
∑
si xi
∂ ln xi
∂ ln E
= 1, the last term
is necessary small when n is large if variety i does not play a special role, and the previous
expression says that the MES is approximately equal to demand elasticity when cross demand
effects (here, measured by the symmetric term ∂ ln x˜ j/∂ ln pi ) are indeed negligible. Finally,
notice that in the CES case, the elasticity above is the same of Yang and Heijdra (1993), whose
equilibrium, therefore, corresponds to a Bertrand equilibrium.
To satisfy the FOCs for profit maximization, it is necessary that “on average” (by using
the market shares as weights) the MESs are larger than 1. In a symmetric Bertrand equilibrium,
markups simplify to the inverse of the true elasticity, and using n(x) = 1/εn(s), we reach the
following result, where the superscript B refers to Bertrand:
Proposition 3. In any symmetric Bertrand equilibrium:
pB − c
pB
= n
1 + (n − 1)εn(sB) =
nn(x B)
n(x B) + n − 1 . (15)
Cournotian firms face an elasticity of the inverse demand n − ∂s j
∂xi
x
s
, which is larger than the one perceived by firms in
monopolistic competition, and set a higher markup.
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Again, this allows one to directly compute the symmetric Bertrand equilibrium simply
deriving the appropriate MES or MEC from the utility function, as we will see in next section.
Notice that [1 + (n − 1)εn(s)]/n > εn(s) if εn > 1. Thus, the assumption εn > 1 makes rankable
the equilibrium markups in Bertrand and monopolistic competition.17 In line with a classic result
first derived by Vives (1985) under quasilinear preferences, the Bertrand markup must be below
the Cournot markup. Therefore, we can summarize the ranking of markups as follows:
Corollary 1. Assume εn > 1 (n < 1) everywhere: then for any Cournot equilibrium markup,
there exists a lower Bertrand equilibrium markup which in turn is larger than a monopolistic
competition equilibrium markup.
Finally, we can generalize results already established for particular preferences (see Vives,
1999; D’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gerard-Varet, 2007; Bertoletti and Epifani, 2014)
about the convergence of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria when the number of firms increases
indefinitely:
Corollary 2. The Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium markups converge to the monopolistic
competition markups if the number of firms goes to infinity.
Of course, it is only when the goods tend to become perfect substitutes (the MES increases
unbounded) that all the three equilibria converge to perfect competition.
3. Old and new examples
 In this section, we review particular cases of our general setting, and propose some new
applications with closed-form solutions.
 Directly additive preferences. D-S (1977) assume direct additivity of preferences, that
is:18
Un(x) =
n∑
j=1
u(x j ), (16)
with u ′′ < 0 < u ′ for x > 0. Such a functional form does not actually change with n (provided
that u(0) = 0), and implies that Unji = 0: the MEC is then i j = −xiu ′′(xi )/u ′(xi ) = (xi ), which
depends neither on the behavior nor on the number of competitors (conditionally on xi ). The equi-
librium prices under monopolistic competition, Bertrand competition, and Cournot competition
can be derived, respectively, as:
p = c
1 − (x) , p
B =
[
(x B) + (n − 1)] c
(n − 1)(1 − (x B)) , and p
C = nc
(n − 1)(1 − (xC )) , (17)
where the budget constraint can be used to explicitly solve these relations. The equilibrium
markup under monopolistic competition is decreasing or increasing in the number of firms
depending on whether  ′(x) is positive or negative (because entry reduces the consumption of
individual varieties). For instance, the (negative) exponential case u = 1 − e−x , first analyzed in
17 The intuition is again simple and relies on the internalization of the indirect impact of a price increase on demand
under Bertrand competition. Differentiating
∑
j s j x j (s) = 1 with respect to si and making use of (5) yields that, in a
symmetric equilibrium 1 = −∑nk=1 ∂xk∂si sx = εn − n ∂x j∂si sx (i = j). Then, εn > 1 implies that ∂x j∂si > 0, that is, that varieties
are “gross, p-substitutes” (Hicks, 1970). Accordingly, Bertrand firms perceive the true Marshallian elasticity n − ∂x j
∂si
s
x
,
which is smaller than the one perceived by firms in monopolistic competition, and actually price higher.
18 D-S (1977) also considered an outside commodity with consumed quantity xo: extending our definition of
monopolistic competition to such a setting (i.e., with utility functions U˜ (xo,Un(x)) and V˜ (so, V n(s)), where so is the
price-income ratio of the outside good) is straightforward. For an example with indirect additivity, see Bertoletti and Etro
(2014). On quasilinear preferences, see Vives (1999) and Anderson, Erkal, and Piccinin (2012).
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Bertoletti (1998), delivers  = x , therefore, the markup declines with entry. In particular, the
three equilibrium prices can be derived as:
p = c + E
n
, pB = E + nc
2n
[
1 +
√
1 + 4ncE
(n − 1)(E + nc)2
]
, and pC = nc
n − 1 +
E
n
.
Instead, a first example of markups increasing in the number of firms was provided by Bertoletti,
Fumagalli, and Poletti (2008) for subutilities such as u = x + 2√x , where  = 1/(2 + 2√x).19
Strategic interactions determine markups that can be nonmonotonic in the number of firms.
 Indirectly additive preferences. Bertoletti and Etro (2014) assume indirect additivity,
that is:
V n(s) =
n∑
j=1
v(s j ), (18)
with v′′ > 0 > v′. Such a functional form again does not change with n (if v = 0 for the varieties
that are not purchased) and implies V nji = 0: the MES is εi j = −siv′′(si )/v′(si ) = ε(si ), which
again depends neither on the competitors’ behavior nor on their number. The three symmetric
equilibria can be derived as:
p = ε(s)c
ε(s) − 1 , p
B = [1 + (n − 1)ε(s
B)]c
(n − 1)(ε(sB) − 1) , and p
C = nε(s
C )c
(n − 1)(ε(sC ) − 1) . (19)
Markups are independent from the number of firms under monopolistic competition and decreas-
ing with respect to n under strategic interactions. Our formulas allow a direct computation. With
the “addilog” 20 specification v = (a−s)1+γ
1+γ , where a > 0 and γ > 0 parametrize willingness to pay
and demand elasticity, we have ε = γ s/(a − s) and the equilibrium prices are:
p = aE + γ c
γ + 1 , p
B =
 +
√
2 + 4aEc(γ+1)
n+1
2(γ + 1) , and p
C = aE +
nγ c
n−1
γ + 1 ,
where = aE + γ c − c/(n − 1). The (negative) exponential case v = e−bs , with b > 0, provides
ε = bs and the equilibrium prices:
p = c + E
b
, pB = 1
2
[
 +
√
2 + 4cE
(n + 1)b
]
, and pC = nc
n − 1 +
E
b
,
where  = c + E/b.
 Homothetic preferences. Benassy (1996) discussed some instances of homothetic prefer-
ences: as it is well known that the elasticities i j and εi j are homogeneous of degree zero under
homotheticity, the symmetric equilibrium markups must be a function of the number of varieties
alone. Here, we will present three non-CES21 examples in detail.
19 Notice that the CES case emerges in the isoelastic case: u = xρ/ρ, ρ < 1. Bertoletti, Fumagalli, and Poletti
(2008) studied the case of the “mixtures” u = xρ/ρ + x δ/δ, 1 ≥ ρ > δ > 0, which generate a decreasing (x).
20 Bertoletti and Etro (2014) propose this name as a tribute to Houthakker (1960), who used this terminology for
additive specifications.
21 The classes of (symmetric) directly additive, indirectly additive, and homothetic symmetric preferences have
only a common member, given by the CES preferences. Notice that in endogenous growth models a` la Romer (1990) with
multiple inputs produced by monopolistic firms, one can replace a CES technology with any constant returns to scale
technology and obtain markups which depend on the number of inputs alone.
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Translog preferences. Feenstra (2003) has shown that, taking into account the endogenous choice
of the goods to be consumed, symmetric translog preferences imply:
V n(s) = exp
[
−a0 − 1
n
n∑
j=1
log s j − 1
2
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
akj log sk log s j
]
, (20)
where a0 = 1/(2γ n) − 1/(2γ N ), akj = γ /n > 0 for k, j = 1, . . . , n, k = j , and a j j = −γ (n −
1)/n, with γ > 0. In a symmetric equilibrium, we can directly compute εn = 1 + γ n, and the
three equilibria can be derived as follows:
p =
(
1 + 1
γ n
)
c, pB =
(
1 + 1
γ (n − 1)
)
c, and pC = 1 + γ n
γ (n − 1)c. (21)
Markups are decreasing in the number of goods and would become negligible when n → N if
the number of potential varieties N is large enough.
Generalized Leontief preferences. As in the case of translog preferences, the generalized Leontief
preferences, originally presented in Diewert (1971) and recently considered by Feenstra (2014)
in a setting with monopolistic competition, can be represented by a so-called flexible functional
form (see Varian, 1992). Over a set of N potential goods, this is provided by the following indirect
utility function:
V =
[√
s
′
B
√
s
]−1
, (22)
where
√
s′ = [√s1, ..,√sN ] is defined as the (row) vector of the square roots of the normalized
prices, and B is a N × N matrix. To achieve symmetry and satisfy regularity assumptions, we
set bj j = b < 0 and, without loss of generality, bkj = 1 for k, j = 1, . . . , N , k = j . After some
tedious algebra, it can be shown that, assuming b ∈ (−N + 1,−N + 2), preferences depend on
the number of consumed varieties as follows:
V n(s) =
[
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
akj
√
sks j
]−1
, (23)
with parameters aii = a < 0 and ai j = a > 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j defined in Appendix B
as functions of b, n, and N .
Accordingly, we obtain the following demand for good i :
xi =
a − a + a∑nk=1√ sksi∑n
k=1
∑n
j=1 akj
√
sks j
.
Because the perceived demand elasticity is:
εn(si , s) =
a
2
∑n
k=1
√
sk
si
a − a + a∑nk=1√ sksi ,
in a symmetric equilibrium, we have:
εn = na
2[a + (n − 1)a] =
n
2(N + b − 1) , (24)
which is linear in the number of consumed goods. This allows us to directly compute the three
symmetric equilibria. Let us restrict attention to a specific case by setting b = 3/2 − N . Then,
εn = n and thus:
p = nc
n − 1 , p
B = (n
2 − n + 1)c
(n − 1)2 , and p
C = n
2c
(n − 1)2 . (25)
C© The RAND Corporation 2016.
804 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Again, markups decrease with the number of varieties and become negligible when n → N if N
is large enough.
Generalized linear direct utility. An example of interesting preferences that have not yet22 been
applied to the analysis of imperfect competition can be represented by the following direct utility
function (see Diewert, 1971, who associated it to the names of Roy Allen, Daniel McFadden, and
Paul Samuelson and called these preferences generalized linear):
U = √x′B√x, (26)
where
√
x′ = [√x1, ..,√xN ], the off-diagonal elements of the N × N matrix B, bi j , are positive
and equal, and bii = b (i, j = 1, . . . , N , i = j). Notice thatU is concave, homogeneous of degree
1, and strictly monotonic if also b > 0, which we assume.
If only n < N varieties are actually available, this utility reduces to:
Un(x) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bi j
√
xi x j , (27)
whose functional form once again does not depend on n. Let us normalize bi j = 1 for any i = j ,
so that utility becomes U = nx(n − 1 + b) in the case of symmetric consumption. Computation
shows that μ˜n(x) = Un(x) by homogeneity, and as:
hn(xi , x) = b − 1 + 1√
xi
n∑
j=1
√
x j , and h
n
1(xi , x) = −
x−3/2i
2
n∑
j=1
√
x j ,
we obtain:
n(xi , x) =
∑n
j=1
√
x j
2
∑n
j=1 bi j
√
x j
.
Notice that in a symmetric equilibrium:
n = n
2(n − 1 + b) , (28)
which satisfies ∂n/∂n < 0 if and only if b < 1.
An increase of n produces an anticompetitive effect undermonopolistic competition if b > 1,
but in any case we have limn→∞ n = 1/2, that is, the markup would never become negligible even
if n was very large. In the specification with b = 1, the equilibrium markup is independent from
the number of goods because the MEC is constant for a symmetric consumption. Whereas CES
preferences are the only separable preferences that induce constant markups, our result shows that
there are other well-behaved preferences that produce the same result in symmetric equilibria, and
further examples can be constructed. As usual, we can derive the full set of imperfect competition
equilibrium prices:
p = 2c, pB = (2n − 1)c
n − 1 , and p
C = 2nc
n − 1 . (29)
Also, the general case (b = 1) provides interesting results, with markups that can increase in
the number of firms not only under monopolistic competition, but also with strategic interactions.
Under monopolistic competition, the general markup is:
p − c
p
= n
2(n − 1 + b) , (30)
22 It is worth noting that the generalized linear preferences, that can be represented by a direct utility function which
is a quadratic mean of order 1, do not belong to the QMOR expenditure function class of preferences considered by
Feenstra (2014).
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which is increasing in the number of firms if b > 1. Strategic interactions add a competition
effect, that however does not necessarily compensate the anticompetitive effect inherited through
n . Indeed, under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we can compute the following markups:
pC − c
pC
= n
2 + n − 2 + 2b
2n2 − 2n + 2nb and
pB − c
pB
= n
2
2n2 − 3n + 2 + 2(n − 1)b , (31)
which might be both increasing in the number of firms if this is large enough. In particular, under
Cournot competition, the markup is increasing with respect to n if and only if:
(2n + 1)[n2 − n + nb] > [n2 + n − 2 + 2b][n − 1 + b],
which simplifies to (b − 2)n2 > 4n(b − 1) + 2b2 − 4b + 2. Under Bertrand competition, the
markup increases with respect to n if:
2n[2n2 − 3n + 2 + 2(n − 1)b] > n2[4n − 3 + 2b],
that is, n(2b − 3) > 4(b − 1). For instance, for b = 3, the price is increasing in the number of
firms if n > 4 + √24 under Cournot competition and if n > 8/3 under Bertrand competition.
As far as we know, this is the first computable example of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with
prices increasing in the number of firms in a representative consumer model (for similar results,
but in spatial models, see Chen and Riordan, 2007). Notice, however, that even when the price is
increasing in the number of firms, equilibrium profits remain decreasing in it, which will allow
us to analyze endogenous market structures later on.
 Quadratic direct utility. We now move to the general field of nonhomothetic preferences
that are also nonseparable. Let us consider the following utility function:
Un(x) = α
n∑
j=1
x j − γ
2
n∑
j=1
x2j −
η
2
(
n∑
j=1
x j
)2
, (32)
where α, γ , η > 0. This looks similar to the quasilinear utility function popularized byMelitz and
Ottaviano (2008), but of course it differs from that because we do not have quasilinear preferences
here (and we consider a finite number of goods).23 The functional form ofUn(x) does not change
with the number n of available varieties, and its derivatives are given by hn(xi , x) = α − γ xi −
η
∑n
j=1 x j . Accordingly, the demand function perceived under monopolistic competition is a
linear demand with hn1(xi , x) = −γ . It is easy to show that Un(x) is concave, and that if we
restrict our attention to the case in which hn(xi , x) > 0 for any i = 1, . . . , n, it is also strictly
monotonic. The inverse demand function for variety i is given by:
si =
α − γ xi − η
∑n
j=1 x j
α
∑n
j=1 x j − γ
∑n
j=1 x
2
j − η
(∑n
j=1 x j
)2 ,
with perceived demand elasticity:
n(xi , x) = γ xi
hn(xi , x)
.
In the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain:
n(x) = γ x
α − γ x − nηx , (33)
23 For a recent example of a model with monopolistic competition and quasilinear quadratic preferences (and a
continuum of goods), see Di Comite, Thisse, and Vandenbussche (2014).
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with ∂n/∂n, ∂n/∂x > 0, limx→0 n(x) = 0, and limx→α/(2γ+nη) n(x) = 1.24 Therefore, we have:
p = c
1 − n(x) = m(x, n)c, (34)
where m(x, n) = hn(x)/(α − 2γ x − nηx), m(0, n) = 1, and ∂ lnm/∂ ln x > ∂ lnm/∂ ln n > 0.
Because a monopolistic competition equilibrium is then characterized by:
E
n
= m(x, n)xc, (35)
we can be sure that such an equilibrium does exist and it is unique. Notice that (35) implies
∂x/∂E > 0 and ∂x/∂n < 0, and accordingly, ∂p/∂E > 0 and ∂p/∂n < 0: a seemingly25 com-
petitive effect emerges even in the absence of strategic interactions. Similarly, we obtain the
following prices:
pC = nm(x
C , n)c
(n − 1) and p
B = [nm(x
B, n) − 1]c
(n − 1) (36)
under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
 Quadratic indirect utility. We finally introduce a class of generalized quadratic prefer-
ences that has not been explored (as far as we know) in the literature on imperfect competition:
V = s′βs− α′s, (37)
where β is a N × N matrix and α a N vector, and N is, as usual, the given total number of
potential varieties. To achieve symmetry and to obtain a well-behaved indirect utility function,
we assume that α j = α > 0, βi j = −b < 0, and βi i = β, i, j = 1, . . . , N , i = j . Normalizing
β = b(N − 1) > 0, Appendix B shows that V is convex (β is a positive semidefinite matrix), and
monotonic decreasing in the case αι ≥ 2βs, to which we restrict our attention. Moreover, after
some tedious algebra, preferences over the n consumed varieties can be expressed as:
V n(s) =
n∑
j=1
[
b(N − 1)s2j − bs j
n∑
k = j
sk
]
− αN − nb(N − n)s¯2 − N − n
nb
α2
4
= const − αNs¯ + nb[NVar{s} − nCov{s}], (38)
where const = − α2(N−n)
4nb
and s¯ = ∑nj=1 s j/n is the mean value, Var{s} = ∑nj=1 s2j /n− s¯2 the
variance, and Cov{s} =∑nj=1∑nk=1 s j sk/n2 − s¯2 the covariance of the normalized prices s.
The individual demand function has thus the linear form:
xi =
αN
n
− 2bN (si − s¯)
|μn(s)| .
It is perhaps remarkable that, whenwe properly take into account the choke price of the unavailable
varieties, the direct demand is perceived as linear in the difference between the own price and
the average price of the available varieties, so reproducing the typical form adopted in textbook
examples of monopolistic competition.
Because gn(si , s) = 2bN (si − s¯) − αN/n, the demand elasticity perceived in monopolistic
competition is given by:
εn(si , s) = 2bsiα
n
− 2b(si − s¯) ,
24 Accordingly, n < 1 requires x < α/(2γ + nη). Incidentally, notice that γ → 0 leads to marginal-cost pricing
(as goods tend to become perfect substitutes, monopolistic competition tends to perfect competition) and η = 0 makes
preferences directly additive.
25 Notice that demand elasticity decreaseswith respect to n for a given level of consumption x . However, it is easily
proved that dm/dn = ∂m/∂n + (∂m/∂x)(∂x/∂n) < 0 if and ony if ∂ lnm/∂ ln x > ∂ lnm/∂ ln n, a condition which is
here satisfied.
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which becomes
εn(s) = 2bns
α
(39)
in a symmetric equilibrium.26 Notice that εn increases with ns,27 and solving for the symmetric
equilibrium prices, we have:
p = c + αE
2bn
, pB =
 + 2
√
2 + 8ncbαE
n−1
4nb
, and pC = nc
(n − 1) +
αE
2bn
, (40)
where  ≡ αE + 2ncb. Prices increase in income and decrease in the number of goods in all
cases.
4. Endogenous market structures
 We now consider the impact of free entry of firms. Our aim is to analyze how the main
exogenous parameters, namely, the size of the market L , the income of consumers E , and the
marginal cost of production c affect the endogenous market structure, that is, the equilibrium
number of firms, the price, and the production of each firm.28
The symmetric equilibrium price must satisfies the condition:
p − c
p
= 1
θ (p/E, n)
, (41)
where the specific functional form for demand elasticity θ (s, n) > 1 depends on the mode of
competition—see (8), (13), and (15). The zero-profit condition (p − c)EL/pn = F provides the
second equilibrium relation between the price and the number of firms:
p = cEL
EL − nF , (42)
and this is an increasing and convex function with respect to n, independent from the competition
mode. Of course, the free-entry equilibrium is at the crossing of the two relations in the space
(n, p).
Let us defineψs(s, n) ≡ ∂ ln θ/∂ ln s andψn(s, n) ≡ ∂ ln θ/∂ ln n as the partial elasticities of
θ (s, n) with respect to price and number of firms,29 and let A(s, n) = θ − 1 + ψs and D(s, n) =
(θ − 1)(1 + ψn) + ψs . We now show that A, D > 0 are necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a unique and well-behaved (stable) equilibrium. The equilibrium profit as a function
of the number of firms is
π (n) = EL
nθ (s(n), n)
− F,
where s(n) solves (41), and by differentiation we obtain:
d ln s(n)
d ln n
= −ψn(s, n)
A(s, n)
.
Notice that the range of π (n) is (−F,∞): thus, a free-entry equilibrium with π (n) = 0 exists and
is unique for any F, L , E, c > 0 if and only if π ′(n) < 0 everywhere. Because:
d{nθ (s(n), n)}
dn
= θ (s, n)
[
1 + ψn + ψs d ln s
d ln n
]
26 Note that a comparison with (33) confirms that (38) and (32) actually represent different preferences.
27 Under our assumptions, εn > 1 requires ns > α/2b.
28 As it will become clear below from the equilibrium conditions, L and F have just opposite impacts on them.
29 As usual in this literature, we treat n as a continuous variable and assume the differentiability of the relevant
functions with respect to n.
C© The RAND Corporation 2016.
808 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
= θ (s, n)D(s, n)
A(s, n)
, (43)
it follows that a unique free-entry equilibrium exists if and only if D/A > 0 everywhere. More-
over, we can write the equilibrium system as:
p − θ (p/E, n)
[θ (p/E, n) − 1]c = 0 and n −
EL
Fθ (p/E, n)
= 0, (44)
whose Jacobian is:
J (p, n) =
⎡⎢⎣1 + ψsθ−1
p
n
ψn
θ−1n
p
ψs 1 + ψn
⎤⎥⎦ .
According to a well-known result, the system (44) is then (locally) stable if and only if the real
part of each eigenvalue of −J is negative, a condition which is easily seen to be equivalent to
D > 0.30 Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique and well-
behaved free-entry equilibrium is that A and D are both positive everywhere.31
Our first conclusion from these technicalities is a ranking of the equilibrium number of firms
and markups emerging under the three forms of competition, as an immediate consequence of
Corollary 1 and of the positive relation between price and number of firms noted above:
Proposition 4. Assume A, D > 0 everywhere: the free-entry equilibrium number of firms and
markup under Cournot competition are higher than those under Bertrand competition, which are
higher than those under monopolistic competition.
 The impact of market size, income, and productivity on the endogenous market struc-
ture. Total differentiation of the equilibrium system (44) provides the following elasticities of
the equilibrium variables with respect to income E , market size L , and marginal cost c:
d ln p
d ln L
= −ψn
D
and
d ln n
d ln L
= θ − 1 + ψs
D
> 0, (45)
d ln p
d ln E
= ψs − ψn
D
and
d ln n
d ln E
= θ − 1 + θψs
D
, (46)
d ln p
d ln c
= 1 − ψs
D
> 0 and
d ln n
d ln c
= −(θ − 1)ψs
D
, (47)
where the signs follows from our assumption that A, D > 0. Let us call “markup neutrality” the
property for which a change in one of the exogenous parameters does not affect the equilibrium
markup. The comparative statics in (45)–(47) implies that the market size is neutral on the markup
if and only if ψn = 0, income is neutral if and only if ψs = ψn , and the marginal cost is neutral
if and only if ψs = 0. The implications for our examples are immediate under monopolistic
competition:
(i) Market-size neutrality holds not only with CES preferences (Krugman, 1980) but under any
case of indirect additivity: in these cases, a market that is twice as large attracts a double
number of firms selling the same quantity at the same price and generating pure gains from
variety32;
30 The condition is given by tr{J } > 0 and |J | > 0.
31 The use of the stability condition to give a sign to A is, of course, an application of Samuelson’s Correspondence
Principle.
32 Obviously, the equilibrium price is relative to the nominal price of the numeraire: that is, ∂ ln p/∂ ln E +
∂ ln p/∂ ln F + ∂ ln p/∂ ln c = 1. Accordingly, different neutralities imply different empirical predictions that are in
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(ii) Income neutrality holds under direct additivity (see, e.g., Zhelobodko et al., 2012 and
Bertoletti and Etro, 2014) and even in the quadratic indirect utility case because the elasticity
of substitution depends on ns under symmetric consumption: in these cases, a doubling of
income induces a doubling of the number of firms;
(iii) Marginal-cost neutrality holds under all homothetic preferences, so that changes in produc-
tivity are translated proportionally on prices, as already noted in Kimball (1995) and Benassy
(1996), and do not affect the number of firms: in trade and macroeconomic applications,
this produces complete pass-through and markups that depend only on the number of firms.
The three neutralities hold at the same time, that is, markups are constant under CES
preferences but also in other specifications generating a constant elasticity of substitution under
symmetric consumption, as in our example of generalized linear preferences (with b = 1).
Following a terminology which is widespread but overlooks the distinction between the
role of the number of varieties in affecting substitutability (demand side) and the role of the
number of competitors in shaping strategic interactions (supply side), we might say that an
increase of income, market size, or productivity exerts a competition effect if it reduces the
equilibrium markup. Notice that such an effect is associated in the first two cases (larger income
and population) with an increase less than proportional of the number of firms, and in the third
case (higher productivity) with a reduction of it (a case of so-called business destruction). The
next result summarizes the general comparative statics of the free-entry equilibrium:
Proposition 5. Assume A, D > 0 everywhere: (a) an increase in the market size exerts a com-
petition effect if and only if ψn > 0; (b) an increase in income exerts a competition effect if and
only if ψs < ψn; (c) an increase in productivity exerts a competition effect if and only if ψs < 0.
The implications for the case of monopolistic competition are again particularly revealing.
To exemplify our results, let us consider the example of a quadratic direct utility, in which none
of the mentioned three neutralities holds. From (33), we can obtain θ = n(αs − η)/γ − 1, which
implies:33
ψs = αsn
αsn − ηn − γ > ψn =
n(αs − η)
n (αs − η) − γ > 0.
Accordingly, under free entry, an increase in market size reduces markups ( d ln p
d ln L
< 0), an increase
in productivity increases the markups ( d ln p
d ln c
< 1), and an increase in income increases prices
( d ln p
d ln E
> 0), expanding the number of firms more than proportionally.
Similar applications of the first result of Proposition 5 can be done to our other examples.
In particular, let us focus first on the impact of an increase in market size: this issue is of
particular relevance in trade theory because equivalent to opening up to frictionless trade (with
an identical country), which determines welfare effects through increased variety and/or price
changes (Krugman, 1979, 1980). It produces a competition effect under direct additivity when
the elasticity of substitution decreases with the size of consumption, whereas an anticompetitive
effect arises in the opposite case (see Zhelobodko et al., 2012 and Bertoletti and Epifani, 2014). A
competition effect shows up also in the translog case, under generalized Leontief preferences and
in the case of a quadratic indirect utility. Finally, a generalized linear direct utility can generate
either a competitive or an anticompetitive effect of the market size.
The second result of Proposition 5 is about changes in income, that are particularly rele-
vant for comparisons between countries with different per-capita income, or in macroeconomic
analysis of the impact of demand shocks affecting consumer expenditure. A rise of income has
principle testable. For instance, indirect additivity implies d ln p/d ln E + d ln p/d ln c = 1: population should not affect
prices and the elasticities of prices with respect to income and marginal cost should add to one.
33 Notice that θ > 1 requires n(αs − η) > 2γ .
C© The RAND Corporation 2016.
810 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
a competitive effect only if ψn > ψs : clearly, this is a condition which can be satisfied under
several cases, such as indirect additivity with ψs < 0, or homotheticity with ψn > 0 (a condition
that holds with translog and generalized Leontief preferences). Nevertheless, markups increasing
in income are much more in line with the trade evidence on pricing to market (for instance, see
Simonovska, 2015 and Bertoletti, Etro, and Simonovska, 2016), and with some macroeconomic
evidence on procyclical markups (Nekarda and Ramey, 2013): such a positive relation emerges
naturally under indirect additivity when demand elasticity increases in the price-income ratio
(ψs > 0).
The third result of Proposition 5 is about changes in the marginal cost, whose implications
are critical in the macroeconomic analysis of the impact of supply shocks affecting productivity
or, in other fields, such as public economics, when taxes are shifted on prices. Our result shows
that the price sensitivity of demand elasticity is what matters to determine the translation of
marginal costs (including taxes or exchange rates or any other cost wedge) on prices. In the
(arguably) more realistic case in which demand is perceived as more rigid when income increases
(ψs > 0), changes in productivity are translated less than proportionally on prices, and additional
costs are undershifted (a case of incomplete pass-through). This is, for instance, what happens in
both of our quadratic examples.
Moving briefly to the case of oligopolistic competition, strategic interactions tend to increase
the value of ψn , thus raising the chances of getting competition effects due to an increase of
market size or income. Consider, for instance, a population increase: even when a larger market
size decreases demand elasticity under monopolistic competition, strategic interactions may give
rise to a competition effect on markups, in particular if the number of firms is small. We can state
unambiguous results with homothetic preferences, as in this case markups depend only on the
number of goods:
Corollary 3. Under homotheticity, endogenous market structures generate neutrality of produc-
tivity, whereas income and market size exert a competition effect if and only if ψn > 0.
The case of homothetic preferences is particularly relevant in dynamic (macroeconomic)
applications. For example, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) have studied the impact of ag-
gregate shocks in a monopolistic competition model with endogenous entry. These shocks can
be magnified by competition effects when demand elasticity increases with entry, as with the
translog preferences adopted by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) or with the introduction of
strategic interactions a` la Bertrand or Cournot, as in Etro and Colciago (2010).
 Examples with monopolistic competition. We conclude this section with a few closed-
form solutions for the number of firms which can be used in applications, and are also useful for
the welfare comparisons of the next section. We restrict the analysis to the case of monopolistic
competition for the sake of brevity.
For the class of directly additive preferences, examples of free-entry equilibria with monop-
olistic competition are well known by now. Limiting our attention to the two examples mentioned
in Section 3, the negative exponential case delivers the number of firms n = E
2c
(
√
1+ cLF −1), whereas
the example of Bertoletti, Fumagalli, and Poletti (2008) generates the equilibrium number of
firms n = EL
2F
[1 + F
cL
(1 +√1+ cLF )]−1. It is easy to verify that an increase in population exerts a
competition effect in the former case and an anticompetition effect in the latter.
For the class of indirectly additive preferences, the addilog specification delivers n = (aE−c)EL
F(aE+γ c)
firms under free entry, whereas the negative exponential gives n = E2L
F(bc+E) firms: both values are
proportional to the population, but increase more than proportionally with an income expansion.
Incidentally, notice that a more elastic demand (respectively, with higher values of the parameters
γ and b) reduces markups and the equilibrium number of firms.
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Let us move to homothetic preferences. In the translog example, we can solve for the
free-entry number of goods as:
n =
√
EL
γ F
+
(
1
2γ
)2
− 1
2γ
. (48)
This implies that total income EL raises less than proportionally the number of firms: the reason
is that business creation reduces the markups. Similar competition effects are associated to the
case of the generalized Leontief preferences (b = −N + 3/2):
n =
√
EL
F
. (49)
Instead, the case of a generalized linear direct utility delivers the following equilibrium under
monopolistic competition:
n = EL
2F
+ 1 − b, (50)
which is exactly proportional to total income EL only if b = 1 (and indeed, ψn = 0). Otherwise,
different outcomes are possible because larger and/or richer markets can either increase or
decrease the markups.
Finally, let us consider our examples of nonhomothetic and nonseparable preferences. In
the case of a quadratic direct utility, the closed-form solution is complex but we have already
discussed its comparative statics. Under the quadratic indirect utility, the equilibrium number of
firms with monopolistic competition is given by:
n =
αE
(√
1 + 8bcL
αF
− 1
)
4bc
, (51)
which shows how the endogenous market structure is affected by all parameters: the number
of firms/goods provided by the market increases proportionally with per-capita income but less
than proportionally with market size, whereas an increase in productivity attracts entry and
reduces markups. Most important, replacing the number of firms in the pricing rule (40), one can
immediately verify that the free-entry equilibrium price is independent from income: accordingly,
the neutrality of spending holds also under a quadratic indirect utility.
5. Optimal market structures
 The optimal organization of production can be reached in our framework by a social planner
controlling number of firms, production, and prices.34 Such an optimal market structure can be
identified maximizing utility under the resource constraint EL = ncxL + nF . This is equivalent
to the use of the consumer budget constraint and of the firm zero-profit condition, which can be
combined to obtain (42). Let us define U (x ; n) = Un(xι) and equivalently, V (s; n) = V n(sι). We
can now define welfare as:
W (n) = U
(
E
cn
− F
cL
; n
)
or W (n) = V
(
cL
EL − Fn ; n
)
. (52)
Let us also define φ(x ; n) ≡ Ux (x ; n)x/U (x ; n) as the elasticity of the direct utility with
respect to consumption and ϕ(x ; n) ≡ Un(x ; n)n/U (x ; n) as the elasticity of the direct utility with
respect to the number of varieties (notice that φ is the so-called “scale elasticity” of Un at xι).
Similarly, let φ˜(s; n) ≡ −Vs(s; n)s/V (s; n) and ϕ˜(s; n) = Vn(s; n)n/V (s; n).
34 On the optimal market structures, see the original contribution by D-S (1977) and the extensions in Vives (1999),
and more recently Mra´zova´ and Neary (2014).
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Differentiating the equalityU (E/pn; n) = V (p/E ; n), we obtain that φ(E/pn; n) = φ˜(s; n)
and ϕ(E/pn; n) = ϕ˜(s; n) + φ˜(s; n). We can now state the conditions for the optimal provision
of goods in the following result:
Proposition 6. The optimal market structure requires
p∗ = cϕ
φ
and n∗ = EL(1 − φ/ϕ)
F
, (53)
where φ is the elasticity of direct utility with respect to the consumption of each good and ϕ the
elasticity of direct utility with respect to the number of varieties.
Rule (53) implies that price and number of goods provided should be increasing in ϕ, due
to larger benefits from variety, and decreasing in φ, due to larger benefits of expanding the
consumption of each good.
The optimal market structure in case of direct additivity (ϕ = 1) was originally studied by D-
S (1977), and here we only illustrate it with our two examples. The exponential case u = 1 − e−x
leads to excess entry, whereas the subutility u = x + 2√x , instead, leads to suboptimal entry
under monopolistic competition.35 Indeed, in the former case, the optimal number of firms can
be derived as:
n∗ = E
c[−W−1(−e− FcL −1) − 1]
, (54)
whereW−1(·) is the branch of the Lambert function satisfyingW−1 ≤ −1 (see Behrens andMurata,
2012), and in the latter case it is:
n∗ = EL
2F
[
F
4cL
(
1 +
√
1 + 4cL
F
)
+ 1
]−1
. (55)
The optimal market structure under indirect additivity (˜ϕ = 1) has been studied by Bertoletti
and Etro (2014). Under addilog preferences v = (a−s)1+γ
1+γ , the optimal number of firms can be
derived as:
n∗ = EL( − (2 + γ )c)
F( + γ c) , (56)
where  ≡ √4(1 + γ )aE + (γ c)2. In the exponential case v = e−bs , optimality requires:
n∗ = EL( − 1)
F( + 1) , (57)
where  ≡ √1 + 4E/bc. It is easy to verify that in both cases, market equilibria involve excess
entry.36
Homothetic preferences have been analyzed by Benassy (1996), noticing the possibility of
either excess or insufficient free entry under monopolistic competition. Indeed, under homoth-
eticity, the scale of consumption does not matter for the optimal choice, and normalizing the
direct utility to be homogeneous of degree 1 we get U (x ; n) = xUn(ι) = nt(n)x , with φ = 1
and ϕ(n) = 1 + χ (n), where χ (n) = d ln t(n)/d ln n is what Benassy (1996) called the “taste for
35 This is so because the elasticitiesφ = u ′(x)x/u(x), which depend only on the consumption size x , are, respectively,
decreasing and increasing in it (see D-S, 1977).
36 This is due to the fact that the elasticities φ˜ = −v′(s)s/v(s), which depend only on the normalized price s, are
increasing with respect to it (see Bertoletti and Etro, 2014).
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variety” embedded into preferences. It follows from (53) and (44) that a sufficient condition
for excess (insufficient) entry under homothetic preferences is χ (n) < (>)1/(θ (n) − 1). Analo-
gously, we can write V (s; n) = V n(ι)/s = v(n)/s, with ϕ˜(n) = d ln v(n)/d ln n, and the sufficient
condition for excess (insufficient) entry becomes ϕ˜(n) < (>)1/(θ (n) − 1).
In the case of translog preferences we actually have:
V (s; n) = 1
s
exp
(
1
2γ N
− 1
2γ n
)
,
with
ϕ˜(n) = 1
2γ n
<
1
γ n
= 1
εn − 1 .
This shows that the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium is characterized by excess entry,
as can be verified comparing n from (48) to its optimal value:
n∗ =
√
EL
2γ F
+
(
1
4γ
)2
− 1
4γ
. (58)
In the case of generalized Leontief preferences, always under our convenient specification
(b = −N + 3/2), we obtain the following expression for welfare:
V (s; n) = 2(2n − 1)
sn(2N − 1) ,
where
ϕ˜(n) = 1
2n − 1 <
1
n − 1 =
1
εn − 1
shows that again excess entry occurs with imperfect competition. Indeed, the optimal number can
be computed as:
n∗ =
√
EL
2F
. (59)
A generalized linear direct utility implies:
U (x ; n) = nx(n − 1 + b).
Because in this case:
χ (n) = n
n − 1 + b <
n
n − 2 + 2b =
n
1 − n ,
excess entry occurs under monopolistic competition when (perceived) demand elasticity is in-
creasing in the number of firms (b < 1) and insufficient entry arises in the opposite case (b > 1).
Indeed, the optimal number of firms can be computed as:
n∗ = EL
2F
+ 1 − b
2
. (60)
As expected, the equilibrium is efficient only in the notable case of a constant markup, that is,
with b = 1. As far as we know, this is the first example showing that monopolistic competition
equilibria can be efficient beyond the case of CES preferences (of course, the corresponding
strategic equilibria exhibit excess entry).
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Finally, let us move to preferences that are neither additive nor homothetic. In the case of
a quadratic direct utility, we have U (x ; n) = nx[α − x
2
(γ + ηn)], and entry is generally ineffi-
cient.37 In the case of a quadratic indirect utility, we can derive:
V (s; n) = −N − n
nb
α2
4
− αNs,
whose maximization delivers:
n∗ = EL
F
(
1 + 2
√
bcL
αF
) , (61)
which implies excess entry for all free-entry equilibria with imperfect competition. As these
examples show, a variety of outcomes can emerge under general preferences because of the
complex interplay of the elasticities of utility with respect to the consumption of each good and
with respect to the number of varieties.
6. Conclusion
 In this work, we have investigated how the nature of consumer preferences can shape entry
and firm behavior in a market with imperfect competition. For this purpose, we have considered
the technology to be common across firms and exogenous, and we have focused on the basic
forms of competition (in prices or quantities), abstracting from other kinds of strategic interaction.
The aim of this conclusive section is to discuss informally some of the possible extensions and
applications, and to put future research into perspective.
Technology can be endogenized assuming that the fixed cost is an R&D investment chosen by
firms to reduce the marginal cost of production, as in the pioneering work of Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1980). In such a case, the optimal investment for each firm increases in the production level
(Vives, 2008), and the symmetric equilibrium with free entry can be easily characterized. Under
monopolistic competition, the classes of directly additive preferences and indirectly additive
preferences preserve their respective “neutralities”: only market size (income) affects prices
and investments in the first (second) case. Therefore, when income (market size) increases, the
number of firms changes linearly under directly (indirectly) additive preferences. Under strategic
interactions, entry strengthens competition so that the endogenous number of firms can depend in
more complex ways on the size of the market. For instance, the endogenous number of firms can
be constant as in the Cournot model of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), or exhibit an upper bound
or a nonmonotonic relation with the size of the market in the spirit of Sutton (1991). A variety
of examples are examined in Vives (2008), but a more general microfoundation requires further
investigation.
Precommitments to additional strategic aspects or to the mode of competition can also be
analyzed under additive preferences: the profit functions then depend on a single aggregator of
quantities or prices, which is just the marginal utility of income. In this class of “aggregative
games,” we know (see, for instance, Etro, 2006 and Anderson, Erkal, and Piccinin, 2012) that,
under free entry, any firm able to precommit acts with the purpose of becoming more aggressive
than the others (i.e., of selling more at lower prices). For instance, a Stackelberg leader could pre-
commit to set the monopolistic competition price, overinvest in cost reductions, adopt contractual
agreements (with managers, banks, or other stakeholders) that incentivize aggressive pricing, or
simply commit to compete in prices (rather than in quantities) to be more aggressive. As shown
in Etro (2006), this is the only way to obtain positive profits in spite of free entry, gaining market
shares, and reducing the number of entrants. Similar results hold also when multiple firms adopt
simultaneously such precommitments, which suggests a general pattern. However, it would be
37 See Nocco, Ottaviano, and Salto (2014) on a related analysis with quasilinear preferences and heterogeneous
firms.
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useful to examine more general settings where all firms can commit to a preliminary strategy or
to the mode of competition.
Last but not least, we want to stress some useful applications of our setting with general
preferences to international trade andmacroeconomics. Themodern trade literature (Melitz, 2003
and Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) has focused on general equilibrium models with heterogeneous
firms, monopolistic competition, and free entry. Indeed, a stream of recent investigations have
been proposed inmulticountry “gravity”models with variable trade costs and a Pareto distribution
of productivities, focusing on the three main classes of preferences: i.e., homothetic preferences
in Feenstra (2014), directly additive preferences in Arkolakis et al. (2015), and indirectly additive
preferences in Bertoletti, Etro, and Simonovska (2016). Remarkably, three different “neutralities”
(with respect to income, population, and trade costs) emerge in these environments: under direct
additivity, the distribution of consumption is the same across countries, under indirect additivity
the distribution of (normalized) prices is the same across countries, and, finally, under homothetic
preferences, the number of consumed goods is constant in each country. This resonates well with
our results, supporting the idea that the nature of preferences of consumers is fundamental to
shape competition and the incentives to enter a market.
Finally, macroeconomic applications of non-CES preferences with imperfect competition
are only in their infancy because CES aggregators are ubiquitous. So far, additive preferences
have been only rarely used to express per-period utility in dynamic models, but Bilbiie, Ghironi,
and Melitz (2012) have recently investigated the case of homothetic preferences in a fully fledged
dynamicmodel of business cycle. In principle, more general microfoundations of macroeconomic
models could deliver a more realistic pattern for markups and business creation in both the short
run and long run, but such an attempt still lies ahead (see Etro, 2016, building on our framework
in a Ramsey model).
Appendix A: Properties of symmetric functions
Let us consider a twice-differentiable function y = f (x):
f : Rn+ −→ R.
We say that f is symmetric with respect to its arguments x if
f (x) = f (Px), ∀x, ∀P, (A1)
where P is a permutation matrix. The symmetry of f imposes some symmetry also on its derivatives. Define:
fi (x) = ∂ f (x)
∂xi
and fi j (x) = ∂
2 f (x)
∂xi∂x j
,
i, j = 1, . . . , n. Differentiation of (A1) with respect to x yields, in matrix notation:
Df (x) = P′Df (Px).
Because P is orthogonal, that is, P′ = P−1, we obtain:
PDf (x) = Df (Px), ∀x, ∀P, (A2)
which shows that the gradient of a symmetric scalar function is itself a symmetric vector function. Similarly, differentiating
(A2) with respect to x yields:
PD2 f (x) = D2 f (Px)P,
that is,
PD2 f (x)P′ = D2 f (Px), ∀x, ∀P. (A3)
(A2) and (A3) imply that:
fi (x) = h˜(xi , x−i ),
where h˜, which does not depend on i , is symmetric with respect to x−i .
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Indeed, it can be also proved that
fi (x) = h(xi , x), (A4)
where h is symmetric with respect to x. The formal argument for this additional result was kindly provided by Giuseppe
Savare´, of the Department of Mathematics of Pavia University. The proof follows. First, for each symmetric function f (x)
it holds that
f (x) = f˜ (Sn(x)), (A5)
where f˜ is unique and well defined and
Snm(x) =
∑
0<i1<...<im≤n
m∏
k = 1
xik , (A6)
with m = 1, . . . , n. This is so because any x is uniquely determined by the vector function Sn(x) (up to a permutation).
Notice that the n functions Snm :
Sn1 (x) = x1 + x2 + · · · + xn =
n∑
k=1
xk ,
Sn2 (x) = x1x2 + x1x3 + · · · + x1xn + · · · xn−1xn =
∑
0<i1<i2≤n
xi1 xi2 ,
Sn3 (x) =
∑
0<i1<i2<i3≤n
xi1 xi2 xi3 ,
. . .
Snn (x) = x1x2 . . . xn =
n∏
k=1
xk
are symmetric. Second, it turns out that:
Sn−1k (x−i ) =
k∑
j=0
(−1) j x ji Snk− j (x),
where Sn0 = 1: that is, Sn−1(x−i ) can actually be written in terms of Sn(x). It follows immediately that:
h˜(xi , x−i ) = ĥ(xi , Sn−1(x−i )) = h(xi , x), (A7)
where h is symmetric with respect to x. These results imply Lemma 1.
Appendix B: Endogenous Preferences
Let U and V represent the preferences over the N varieties, and suppose that only n of them are available because the
corresponding producers have entered the market. Then:
Un(x) = U (x,0ι) and V n(s) = V (s, so(s)ι),
where ι is the unit vector of dimension N − n and so(s) is the (finite or infinite) choke price of the unavailable varieties,
which possibly depends on the price of those actually provided. The derivation of the endogenous utility functions is
immediate when preferences are additive, but not otherwise. Feenstra (2003) has analyzed the case of translog preferences.
Here, we analyze two more examples used in the text.
Generalized Leontief preferences. The so-called generalized Leontief homothetic expenditure function (Diewert, 1971)
corresponding to (22) is given by:
E(p,U ) = U
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
bi j
√
pi p j = U√p′B√p, (B1)
where
√
p′ = [√p1, ..,√pN ] is the (row) vector of square roots of the elements of p, and N is the total number of
potential varieties, to be kept constant. The demand system is given by:
x(p,U ) = DpE(p,U ) = U (√̂p)−1B√p, (B2)
xi (p,U ) = U
[
b +
∑
j =i
√
p j
pi
]
,
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where xi (p,U ) is the compensated (Hicksian) demand of variety i and the symbol ̂ denotes vector diagonalization
(̂z =
[
z1 0 0
0
.
.
. 0
0 0 zN
]
). Notice that b does not enter the Jacobian Dpx(p,U ), and thus the regularity conditions it has to
satisfy (negative semidefiniteness). However, if all prices are the same, xi (pι,U ) = U [b + (N − 1)], which gives the
condition N > 1 − b.
Finally, the value of b is crucial to account for some variety not being available for consumption because of
being too expensive. Using (B2), one can write (in matrix form) E(p,U ) = p′x(p,U ), as it has to be by homogeneity and
Shephard’s Lemma. Now, let us partition the varieties into the set I of varieties actually consumed, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and the
set J of varieties not available, j = n + 1, n + 2, . . . , N , with pI = [p1, . . . pn], pJ = [pn+1, . . . pN ], B =
[
BI I BI J
BJ I BJ J
]
,
and similarly. By (B2):
xJ = U
(√̂
pJ
)−1
[BJI BJJ ]
√
p = [0],
and it must be the case that √
pJ = −(BJ J )−1BJ I
√
pI (B3)
if BJ J is invertible. However, BJ J can be written as
BJ J = (1 − b)
[
1
1 − b 1N−n,N−n − IN−n,N−n
]
,
where 1N−n,N−n is a (N − n, N − n) matrix with unit entries and I is the relevant identity matrix. Because 1N−n,N−n
has eigenvalues (N − n) and zero, BJ J has eigenvalues N − n − 1 + b and b − 1, and it will then be invertible if
N − n − 1 = −b = −1. Because
xI = U
(√̂
pI
)−1
[BI I BI J ]
[ √
pI√
pJ
]
= U
(√̂
pI
)−1
[BI I BI J ]
[ √
pI
−(BJJ )−1BJI√pI
]
,
we obtain:
En(p,Un) = pI ′xI = UnpI ′
(√̂
pI
)−1
[BI I BI J ]
[ √
pI
−(BJJ )−1BJI√pI
]
= Un
√
pI
′
[BII BIJ ]
[ √
pI
−(BJ J )−1BJ I√pI
]
= Un
[√
pI
′
BII
√
pI −
√
pI
′
BIJ (BJJ )−1BJI
√
pI
]
= Un
√
pI
′ [
BII − BIJ (BJ J )−1BJI]√pI
= Un
√
pI
′
A
√
pI ,
which delivers the indirect utility (23) with A ≡ [BI I − BI J (BJ J )−1BJ I ] as the symmetric (n, n) matrix whose elements
will be discussed below.
Notice that BI J = BJ I ′ = 1n,N−n , and that BJ J is a (N − n, N − n) square matrix whose diagonal elements are
equal to b and extradiagonal elements are equal to 1. Because:
BJ J1N−n = [(N − n) − 1 + b]1N−n = λ1N−n
has the obvious solution λ = N − n − 1 + b, thenBJ J has a unit eigenvector associated to the eigenvalue N − n − 1 + b.
Accordingly, its inverse has a unit eigenvector associated to an eigenvalue given by (N − n − 1 + b)−1. From this, we
can compute:
(BJ J )−1BJ I = 1
N − n − 1 + b 1N−n,n
and
BI J (BJ J )−1BJ I = N − n
N − n − 1 + b 1n,n .
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Notice that replacing the first expression in (B3) implies
√
pJ = −[N − n − 1 + b]−1ι′√pI , which uniquely identifies
the choke price:
p0 =
( ∑n
j=1
√
p j
N − n − 1 + b
)2
. (B4)
Because BI I = [1n,n − (1 − b)In,n], it follows that:
A = BI I − BI J (BJ J )−1BJ I = [1n,n − (1 − b)In,n] − N − n
N − n − 1 + b 1n,n
= b − 1
N − n − 1 + b 1n,n − (1 − b)In,n .
Accordingly,
aii = a = (b − 1)(N − n + b)
N − n − 1 + b , ai j = a =
b − 1
N − n − 1 + b
for i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j . Notice that any b ∈ (−N + 1,−N + 2) satisfies all our assumptions: in particular, this range
implies that b < 0, N > 1 − b, and that BJ J is a negative definite matrix. This ensures that a > 0 > a, so that the
regularity conditions for the utility function (23) are satisfied. As we discuss in the main text, it also guarantees that
εn > 1 for n ≥ 2.
Quadratic indirect utility. Consider now the generalized quadratic indirect utility:
V (s) = s′βs− αS, (B5)
where S = ∑Nj=1 s j , and to achieve symmetry, it is assumed that βi j = β and βi i = β for i, j = 1, . . . , N , i = j , and N
is the total number of potential varieties. Notice that:
β = β1N ,N − (β − β)I = (β − β)
[
β
(β − β) 1N ,N − I
]
.
As 1N ,N has eigenvalues N and 0, the eigenvalues of β are then given by (N − 1)β + β and β −β. Because:
DV (s) = 2βs− αι D2V (s) = 2β,
∂V (sι)
∂si
= 2
N∑
j=1
βi j s − α = 2s[β + (N − 1)β] − α,
to satisfy the conditions of monotonicity and quasiconvexity of V , we assume that α > 0, and that β is a positive
semidefinite matrix. In particular, we assume that (N − 1)β ≥ − β, β > β, β > 0 and restrict attention to the case in
which αι > 2βs. We obtain:
x(s) = DV (s)
DV (s)′s
= − αι − 2βs
2s′βs− αι′s (B6)
with
V (sι) = Ns{s[(N − 1)β + β] − α} < 0.
As in the previous section, let us partition the varieties into the set I of varieties actually consumed,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and the set J of varieties not available, j = n + 1, n + 2, . . . , N , with sI = [s1, . . . sn], sJ = [sn+1, . . . sN ],
β =
[
β I I β I J
β J I β J J
]
, and similarly. Notice that, by (B6), xJ = [0] requires αι = 2[β J I β J J ]s = 2(β J I sI + β J J sJ ),
implying:
sJ = α
2
(β J J )−1ι − (β J J )−1β J I sI ,
because β J J = (β − β)[ β
(β−β) 1N−n,N−n − I] is invertible (and positive definite) under our assumptions. Moreover:
β J J ι = (β − β)
[
β
(β − β) (N − n) − 1
]
ι,
and thus β J J has a unit eigenvector associated to the positive eigenvalue given by β(N − n − 1) + β. This implies that
(β J J )−1 has a unit eigenvector associated to the positive eigenvalue 1/[β(N − n − 1) + β].
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As β J I = β1N−n,n , defining SI =
∑n
j=1 s j , we get:
sJ =
[α
2
− βSI
]
(β J J )−1ι =
α
2
− βSI
β(N − n − 1) + β ι > 0, (B7)
which identifies the (normalized) choke price of the N − n unproduced varieties as a function of the (normalized) prices
of the n varieties actually offered in market:
s0 =
α
2
− βSI
β(N − n − 1) + β . (B8)
Using (B7) and SJ = (N − n)s0 yields:
V = s′βs− α(SI + SJ ) = [sI ′ sJ ′]
[
β I I β I J
β J I β J J
][
sI
sJ
]
− α(SI + SJ )
= [sI ′ sJ ′]
[
β I I sI + β I J sJ
β J I sI + β J J sJ
]
− α(SI + SJ )
= sI ′β I I sI + sI ′β I J sJ + sJ ′β J I sI + sJ ′β J J sJ − αSI − αSJ
= sI ′β I I sI − αSI + 2(N − n)βSI
α
2
− βSI
β(N − n − 1) + β
+ (N − n)
(
α
2
− βSI )2
β(N − n − 1) + β − α(N − n)
α
2
− βSI
β(N − n − 1) + β
= sI ′β I I sI − αSI + (n − N )
(
α
2
− βSI )2
β(N − n − 1) + β
or:
V = sI ′β I I sI +
(n − N )
(
α2
4
+ β2(SI )2
)
− αSI (β − β)
β(N − n − 1) + β .
Let us normalize β = −b < 0, β = b(N − 1) and write s¯ ≡ SI /n for the average normalized price of the available
varieties. Then all our assumptions are satisfied and we reach the indirect utility:
V n =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
βi j si s j + N − n
nβ
α2
4
+ N − n
n
β(SI )2 − αNS
I
n
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
βi j si s j − N − n
nb
α2
4
− nb(N − n)s¯2 − αNs¯, (B9)
which endogenously depends on the number of provided varieties and their prices. Rearranging terms, we get (38).
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